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This study focuses on the intricacies of Turkey’s prospective membership in the European 
Union. It begins with a chronology of EU-Turkey relations and an account of the debate 
on the future of the European Union, which relates to Turkey’s prospective E.U. member-
ship. It then explores the strategic implications of Turkey’s accession to the European Union 
and addresses recent developments on the issue, with an emphasis on the start of accession 
negotiations on Oct. 3, 2005. In conclusion, this study highlights the factors that may have 
an impact on the outcome of EU-Turkey accession negotiations in the coming years.
Turkey’s prospective membership in the European Union has captured significant attention in Europe for several years. Turkey’s geographic 
size, large population, low per-capita income and level of economic develop-
ment, as well as its location at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East 
and Central Asia, have made it a candidate state different from all the oth-
ers. The prospect of Turkey’s EU membership already has been a catalyst 
toward the realization of an ambitious—albeit incomplete—domestic reform 
program, which brought Turkey much closer to the model of consolidated 
liberal democracy. On the EU side, the debate on Turkey’s membership 
has acted as a proxy for a larger and overdue debate on the future shape 
of the European Union. Hidden European fears and prejudices often come 
to surface when the discussion 
touches upon Turkey, which has 
very aptly been described as “Eu-
rope’s tainted mirror.”1 The start 
of accession negotiations on Oct. 
3, 2005 was a major step toward 
Turkey’s EU membership, yet this 
result is by no means guaranteed. 
Completion of the Turkish process of democratic consolidation, resolu-
tion of the EU institutional crisis and, last but not least, winning over an 
unfriendly European public opinion will be key issues for the success of the 
The obstacles to Turkey’s mem-
bership can be overcome in a 
spirit of compromise.
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accession negotiations. Turkey’s EU membership is a technically difficult 
but not impossible task. The existing obstacles arising from Turkey’s de-
mography and economy can be surmounted within a spirit of compromise 
for the mutual benefit of the European Union and Turkey.
Turkey and European Integration: The History2
Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union represents the latest 
and probably the most critical challenge in the 200-year history of Ottoman 
and Turkish efforts to adopt the European political, economic and cultural 
paradigm. Westernization of the Ottoman state, society and culture was the 
primary goal of the Tanzimat reforms in the mid-19th century, while the 
same goal was later adopted by Young Turks and implemented by Kemal 
Atatürk, who believed that the formation of a solid Turkish nation and state 
were prerequisites of Westernization.3
Turkey has pursued close relations with what started as the European 
Economic Community (EEC)4 since the late 1950s.5 Turkey and the Com-
munity signed an Association Agreement in 1963. An Additional Protocol 
signed in November 1970 outlined the rules for a customs union between 
the European Economic Community and Turkey.6 Nonetheless, political 
developments in the 1970s and early 1980s hampered relations between 
Turkey and the Community.
Turkey again became interested in EC membership during the Özal 
administration in the mid-1980s and filed a formal application in 1987. Yet 
crucial time had been wasted, making the situation much less favorable for 
Turkey’s bid.7 Despite the rejection of Turkey’s application in 1989, the im-
provement of EC-Turkey relations continued. A customs union agreement 
between Turkey and the European Union was signed in 1995 and became 
effective in 1996. Nonetheless, Turkey again became disillusioned when the 
EU Luxembourg Summit in 1997 refused to award it the status of a can-
didate state, although numerous other states in East Central Europe and 
the Mediterranean earned this status. This brought EU-Turkey relations to 
their lowest point.8
Relations improved during the Helsinki EU Summit in December 
1999, when Turkey finally became a candidate state. The Helsinki Summit 
also marked the shift of Greece’s position from opposition to support for 
Turkey’s membership. Greece’s obstructive stance had hampered EU-Tur-
key relations ever since Greece joined the European Community in 1981.9 
The start of EU-Turkey accession negotiations would depend on Turkey’s 
compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. Several political reform packages 
attempted to achieve Turkey’s convergence with the Criteria. Constitutional 
amendments aimed to alter the illiberal character of the 1982 Constitution. 
The Constitution was amended eight times between 1995 and 2004, with 
the most far-reaching amendment coming in October 2001.10
As the critical EU-Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 approached, 
Turkey’s political liberalization seemed to proceed at a surprising pace. In 
the course of 10 years, the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the European 
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Union caused the most significant political transformation the Republic 
of Turkey had experienced since the introduction of multiparty politics in 
1945. The Copenhagen Summit decided, however, to defer the decision on 
the commencement of EU-Turkey accession negotiations until the next EU 
Summit in December 2004. Despite Turkey’s disillusionment, reforms aim-
ing at Turkey’s full political liberalization continued. The reward came on 
Dec. 17, 2004, when the starting date of EU-Turkey accession negotiations 
was set for Oct. 3, 2005.
The Emergence of an “Ever Closer Union” and Turkey11
During the 1990s, the European Union underwent a radical transformation. 
It ceased to be a predominantly economic organization regulating a free-
trade zone with minimal political ambitions. Instead, EU leaders sought to 
supplement the organization’s economic character by gradually establishing 
common foreign and security policies. This pivotal switch in the character of 
the Union led to the articulation of the Copenhagen Criteria for prospective 
member states and the rise of the European federal debate. The Copenha-
gen Criteria, adopted at the June 1993 EU Council Summit, required the 
following conditions from prospective member states:
• the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, hu 
 man rights, and respect for and protection of minorities,
• the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity  
 to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European 
 Union, and
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence 
 to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.12
Within the European federal debate, two opinion groups soon formed. On 
one side, the Euro-federalists maintained that the European Union should 
be only an intermediate stage toward the development of a supranational 
European federal state.13 To facilitate this process, political and cultural ele-
ments, which constituted the common European heritage, should form the 
basis of a new, overarching common European identity. Political liberalism 
would be unequivocally among the basic components of that identity, while 
the inclusion of religious elements was heavily contested.
On the other hand, opponents of Euro-federalism contended that the 
European Economic Community’s transformation into the European Union 
should be the final stage of convergence among member states. This side 
believed the European Union should retain a heavily economic character 
and considered the debate on a common European identity to be both chi-
merical and redundant. The influence of Euro-federalist views within the 
European Union, however, meant that Turkey’s membership application 
would be judged not only on its observance of the Copenhagen Criteria, but 
on the country’s compatibility with the common European identity project. 
Some Euro-federalists, who considered Europe’s Greco-Roman and Judeo-
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Christian heritage to be the foundations of European identity, vehemently 
opposed the prospect of Turkey’s membership. Others, who believed that 
Europe’s identity should be based not on religion but on liberal political 
values, strongly supported the accession of a liberal democratic Turkey. They 
argued this would signal the Union’s inclusive, tolerant character.
This debate had a constant bearing on EU-Turkey relations and Tur-
key’s concomitant political liberalization process. The Helsinki EU Council 
Summit’s decision in 1999 to grant Turkey the status of a candidate mem-
ber state implied a positive answer to the question of Turkey’s European 
identity. However, the question of whether Turkey could be considered 
European continued to be debated, affecting European views of Turkey 
and of itself.14 But these debates were not unique to member states. In fact, 
Turkish proponents of Turkey’s membership in the Union had to contend 
with other sources of opposition, not least of which came from the domestic 
political arena.
Strategic Implications of Turkey’s EU Membership15
The Domestic Field
The possibility of Turkey’s accession to the European Union met with the 
suspicion and opposition of a substantial part of the Kemalist military and 
bureaucratic elite.16 In this group’s view, the price of liberal reform and re-
striction of national sovereignty would be the disintegration of the Turkish 
national ideology and, possibly, Turkey itself. The whole nation-building 
project, as conceived by Turkish nationalist leaders in the last years of the 
Ottoman Empire and implemented by Atatürk in the early republican years, 
would be endangered. Existing national minorities might then claim self-
determination and independence, while latent ethnic divisions within the 
Turkish people could re-emerge and threaten Turkish national unity. The 
resuscitation of the “Eastern Question,” concerning the partition of the 
Ottoman Empire, which dominated European politics in the 19th century 
and briefly materialized in 1920 with the Treaty of Sèvres, has haunted 
the political thought of Turkish Euro-skeptics, who also doubt Turkey’s 
European identity.17
On the other hand, there is no other visible political orientation as 
favorable for Turkey as its full participation in the European Union. Mem-
bership in the Union is also still seen as part of the “Kemalist imperative” 
of identification with (implicitly Western) modernity. The European Union 
is viewed as an international organization that can guarantee Turkey’s 
economic development and political stability. Meanwhile, current political 
and economic conditions in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia offer no serious strategic alternatives to Turkey’s option to pursue 
membership in the Union.18 A further deepening of Turkey’s strategic rela-
tionship with the United States and its primary regional ally, Israel, could 
not substitute for Turkey’s EU aspirations. The EU member states are by 
far Turkey’s largest trading partner, while Turkey’s willingness to blindly 
serve U.S. foreign policy objectives is far from given.
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The U.S. Factor
While an increasing strategic rift is thought to threaten long-term relations 
between the United States and the European Union, the United States has 
been one of the most assertive proponents of Turkey’s EU accession.19 The 
improvement of EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s eventual incorporation 
into the Union are viewed as extremely favorable for U.S. strategic interests 
in Europe and the Middle East. Turkey’s membership in the European 
Union is seen as the best guarantee for the consolidation of Turkey’s secular, 
pro-Western political system and globalized economy. Turkey thus could 
serve U.S. regional strategic interests in the Middle East, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia by providing the paradigm of a Muslim democratic state, fully 
integrated in Western political and economic institutions.
Open U.S. support for Turkey’s EU membership20 has led to wide-
spread suspicion within some EU circles that this is part of U.S. efforts 
to subvert the European Union’s transformation into a federal state that 
might be capable of challenging U.S. global hegemony. EU suspicion of the 
U.S. role peaked in December 2002, when U.S. President George W. Bush’s 
open intervention in support of Turkey during the Copenhagen European 
Council backfired.21 This effect became more pronounced as a result of 
European—mainly French and German—opposition during 2002 and 2003 
to the impending U.S. campaign in Iraq.
Still, the technical difficulties posed by Turkey’s possible EU member-
ship were not fictitious. Its large population and weak economy would dis-
turb sensitive balances of political power inside EU institutions and strain 
the organization’s economic and financial capacity. At the political level, 
Turkey’s accession was seen as strengthening the anti-federalist and Atlan-
ticist blocs inside the Union. Steps toward the empowerment of European 
political institutions would become even more difficult, critics noted, while 
the deployment of a European security structure independent of NATO and 
U.S. influence would be shelved, and a common foreign policy would be 
harder to achieve. Turkey thus would undertake the role of a U.S.-sponsored 
“Trojan horse” inside the European Union.22
The weakness of this argument was its assumption that the strategic 
interests of the United States and Turkey were identical. In the aftermath 
of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey is no longer 
in complete agreement with U.S. regional strategic interests and policies. 
Efforts to create a U.S.-Turkey-Israel strategic partnership have had only 
partial success, while the rise to power of Islamic-oriented parties, which 
were more sensitive to the plight of the Palestinian people, made the alliance 
even more precarious. The new U.S. strategic doctrine promulgated after the 
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, also alienated Turkey. The gap grew even 
wider in view of the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. This marked 
a watershed in U.S.-Turkey relations, making clear that U.S. and Turkish 
regional strategic interests might even come into conflict.23 Anti-American-
ism rose to unforeseen levels and became a strong feature of Turkish public 
opinion.24 Even the traditionally pro-U.S. and initially circumspect Turkish 
military eventually moved toward this position. U.S. policies in Iraq came 
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under criticism both from proponents of Turkey’s strategic cooperation 
with the European Union and from staunchly nationalist officers.25 The 
U.S. unwillingness to address Turkey’s security concerns by eliminating the 
remaining PKK forces in Northern Iraq, its ambivalent position regarding 
the future of Northern Iraq and the role of the Iraqi Kurds, and its support 
for Israeli policies in the Middle East served as reasons for different parts of 
Turkish society to support this negative shift in attitudes toward the United 
States. The strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey no 
longer could be considered as a given. Now a credible alternative—an E.U. 
strategic vision—could appeal to Turkish strategic and security concerns 
more effectively.
The European Vision
Turkey’s potential EU accession sparked a serious debate inside the Euro-
pean Union. Although the strategic, political and economic dimensions of 
Turkey’s EU membership have been anything but insignificant, Turkey’s 
EU membership debate also has been a proxy for debates on what the Eu-
ropean Union is or should become. Differing approaches to prospective 
Turkish membership highlight divergent visions of the present and future 
of the European Union project. Supporters and opponents of Turkey’s EU 
membership also have been internally divided, basing their position on dif-
ferent grounds. As different definitions of European identity and visions of 
Europe coexist, the same arguments may be used for and against Turkey’s 
EU membership, thus making the picture even more complex.
Turkey’s Islamic religious and cultural identity can, for example, be 
viewed as a reason either to accept or reject Turkey’s EU membership ap-
plication. This mirrors the lack of consensus on how to deal with religion in 
the debate over a common European identity.26 Advocates of multicultural-
ism and supranationalism, who argue that the EU identity should be based 
on liberal democratic values and cultural diversity, firmly support Turkey’s 
membership. In their view, Europe’s diversity is its strength rather than a 
weakness. Such diversity should be celebrated, as the European Union strives 
to provide an alternative way “not to reproduce a national model at the level 
of the continent but to shape another way for people to live together and 
share a common project,” as Kalypso Nicolaidis puts it.27 The admission 
of a Muslim country into the European Union would constitute the most 
effective guarantee of its secular, inclusive, and multicultural character and 
provide a powerful example to the rest of the world.
On the other hand, Turkey’s Islamic character becomes the most 
powerful argument against the country’s membership, especially for many 
European conservatives who focus on the religious and cultural aspects of 
European identity. In their view, further European integration is possible 
only if the European Union forges an identity based on its Judeo-Christian 
religious and Greco-Roman political heritage. As Turkey lacks this heritage, 
it is unsuitable for EU membership, these critics argue, though some agree 
that a “special relationship” between the European Union and Turkey would 
be desirable for strategic and economic reasons.28
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Turkey’s geographical position, demographic size and level of eco-
nomic development also are used as arguments for and against Turkey’s EU 
membership. This echoes persisting divisions within the European Union 
between those who favor widening over deepening and prefer to view Europe 
as a huge integrated market, on the one hand, and those who favor Europe’s 
deepening and have a clear federal vision for Europe, on the other. Support-
ers of Turkey’s candidacy point to the potential growth of the European 
Union’s strategic role in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
as a result of Turkey’s proximity to these volatile and strategically crucial 
regions. Turkey’s demographics also could be seen as an advantage, as the 
country could help alleviate serious labor shortages in Western Europe and 
the prospective shortfall of contributions to social security systems. Turkey’s 
relatively low level of economic development, combined with its large, young 
population, also makes Turkey a large and tempting market that is far from 
reaching the saturation point.
On the other hand, opponents of Turkey’s membership argue that 
Turkey’s geostrategic position could drag the European Union into unneces-
sary adventures. Instead, these critics say, the European Union should focus 
on establishing a deeper political union among existing member states. 
Without this, any efforts to claim a major European regional role would be 
futile. This political union would be seriously complicated and eventually 
compromised in favor of a wider and more lax economic union if Turkey 
joined the Union. Moreover, the discrepancy between Turkey’s population 
size and economic capacity29 would upset the balance of European policy-
making, seriously strain the EU economy, and result in massive migration of 
Turkish workers30 to the prosperous EU member states, with unpredictable 
socioeconomic consequences. In this view, at a time when the proclamation 
of a European Constitution already has met serious objections, undertaking 
the burden of Turkey’s EU membership would be suicidal for the European 
federal project.31
“Privileged Partnership”
More recently, opposition to the prospect of Turkey’s full EU membership 
has been translated into support for an alternative mode of advanced EU-
Turkey relations called “privileged partnership.” What this means remains 
unclear, as none of its proponents have described it in detail. Instead, the 
implication is that it would entail a closer strategic, political and economic 
relationship between the European Union and Turkey,32 which would, 
however, run short of full membership in such fields as freedom of move-
ment for Turkish citizens and Turkey’s access to EU structural funds and 
subsidies from the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Implicitly it also 
means that Turkey no longer would be pressured to continue its economic 
and political reform program or contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus 
issue and its disputes with Greece.33 This idea became popular among the 
leaders of the German Christian Democratic parties. Both Angela Merkel, 
the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and new German 
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Chancellor, and Edmund Stoiber, the leader of the Bavarian Christian So-
cialist Union (CSU), became active proponents of this “privileged partner-
ship” option,34 lobbying their colleagues in the European Popular Party in 
an effort to win their support for this policy.35
In France, opposition to Turkey’s full EU membership and support 
for a privileged partnership first received expression by Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, former French President and President of the European Con-
vention, which prepared the EU Constitutional Treaty.36 Nicholas Sarkozy, 
the popular leader of President Chirac’s neo-Gaullist party UMP and pos-
sible presidential candidate in the 2007 elections, became the staunchest 
opponent of Turkey’s full EU membership.37 France’s position also was af-
fected by the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in the referendum 
of May 29, 2005. The rejection of the treaty, which aimed to reform EU 
institutions in view of recent enlargement and to shape a path for further 
European integration, was a heavy blow for President Chirac, resulting in 
the resignation of the French government under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre 
Raffarin. Opponents used Turkey as one of their campaign issues, identify-
ing that country’s possible accession as one example of the false path that 
European enlargement had taken. Hence, President Chirac and the new 
French government under Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin attempted 
to appease French public opinion by diluting French support for Turkey’s 
full membership. Interestingly, France developed an unforeseen interest in 
the Cyprus question, objecting to the unilateral Turkish statement of July 
29, 2005, which stated, “the signature of the Additional Protocol to the As-
sociation Agreement neither amounted to the recognition of the Republic 
of Cyprus, nor prejudiced any of its rights and obligations.”38
The next country to object to Turkey’s membership was Austria, which 
became the staunchest advocate of privileged partnership. Support for Tur-
key’s accession in Austrian public opinion is the lowest among EU member 
states.39 Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel repeatedly expressed his opposition 
to Turkey’s full membership, suggesting an alternative model of EU-Turkey 
relations. An additional reason for Austria’s opposition to Turkey’s full 
membership may have been its special interest in achieving membership 
for Croatia. The start of Croatia’s EU accession negotiations was postponed 
due to that country’s lack of cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Perhaps the Austrian government 
thought that stiffening its position on Turkey would allow a subsequent 
compromise to unblock accession negotiations for both states.
The Oct. 3 Crisis
On Dec. 17, 2004, the European Council decided that EU-Turkey accession 
negotiations would start on Oct. 3, 2005, provided Turkey achieved some 
further human rights reforms. Because the EU Commission later reported 
such progress, many thought that drafting the Negotiating Framework 
Protocol would be no more than a technical issue. However, reaching con-
sensus on the protocol turned out to be an extremely difficult task. Austria 
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insisted on including the option of privileged partnership in the document 
and removing a phrase stating that “the shared objective of the negotiations 
is accession.” It also insisted that Turkey should meet the Republic of Cy-
prus’ demand to lift its trade embargo. Further, the Austrian government 
argued that Turkey should withdraw its unilateral statement, made during 
the signing of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, that 
“this signature did not mean recognition of the Greek Cypriot govern-
ment.” Cypriot objections to the protocol were lifted when the European 
Union issued a statement on Sept. 20, 2005 to counter Turkey’s unilateral 
declaration.40 Yet Austrian objections to the text of the Negotiating Frame-
work Protocol persisted until the very day the accession negotiations were 
scheduled to commence. The crisis was finally resolved on Oct. 3, 2005, with 
the withdrawal of Austria’s demands for inclusion of the privileged partner-
ship clause in return for the start of Croatia’s EU accession negotiations.41 
The text of the Negotiating Framework agreement included the following 
conditions in addition to the Copenhagen Criteria:
• Turkey’s unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations and its 
 undertaking to resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity 
 with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with 
 the United Nations Charter, including if necessary jurisdiction of the 
 International Court of Justice42;
• Turkey’s continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settle- 
 ment of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with 
 the principles on which the Union is founded, including steps to contrib- 
 ute to a favorable climate for a comprehensive settlement, and progress in 
 the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Mem- 
 ber States, including the Republic of Cyprus; and
• the fulfillment of Turkey’s obligations under the Association Agreement 
 and its Additional Protocol extending the Association Agreement to all 
 new EU Member States, in particular those pertaining to the EU-Turkey 
 customs union, as well as the implementation of the Accession Partner- 
 ship, as regularly revised.43
The Negotiating Framework Protocol was finally signed in the late hours 
of Oct. 3, 2005, and a ceremony for the start of EU-Turkey accession nego-
tiations was held thereafter. Nevertheless, despite the ensuing celebrations 
and optimism, it became evident early on that that this was the beginning 
of a very long and cumbersome negotiation process.44 
The Road Ahead
What does the future hold for EU-Turkey accession negotiations? To be-
gin, the accession negotiations will be largely technical. They will refer to 
35 separate chapters and focus on how and when Turkey will adapt to the 
European acquis communautaire, the 100,000-page body of European legisla-
tion accumulated since the foundation of the European Economic Com-
munity in 1957.45 The costs of convergence will be high for both sides, and 
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political factors will affect whether the parties will be willing to undertake 
them. The course of political developments within the European Union and 
Turkey over the following decade will have a crucial impact on whether the 
European Union—or Turkey itself—maintains its interest in Turkey’s EU 
membership. If the European Union succeeds in overcoming its current 
constitutional crisis and finding answers to the questions posed by consecu-
tive waves of enlargement and globalization, then it will be more able to 
deal with the additional structural problems Turkey’s potential member-
ship would pose. While there has been a positive correlation between vot-
ing power and contribution to the EU budget among existing EU member 
states, Turkey’s entry will disturb this balance drastically. By the time of its 
potential accession, Turkey is expected to be the most populous country 
of the Union, which will be translated into the strongest representation in 
the European Parliament and a sizeable voting allocation. The EU Consti-
tutional Treaty took into account past and future enlargement steps of the 
Union and attempted to address, among other issues, power allocation, 
decision-making and vote weighting among member states.
The failure of the Constitutional Treaty will greatly hamper the 
Union’s smooth operation, with or without Turkey’s membership.46 The 
European Union’s success in claiming a global geopolitical role also will be 
of major importance.47 If the Union manages to develop a strong common 
foreign and security policy, then Turkey’s EU membership will become 
more attractive, due to the important geostrategic benefits it will entail for 
the Union.
Turkey will improve its chances for accession greatly if it continues 
to carry out its political and economic reform program.48 In both fields, 
significant progress already has been made, but much more is necessary. In 
the field of political reform, Turkey clearly lags behind European standards 
in many respects. Minority rights and freedom of expression are only two 
of the fields in which substantial progress is necessary.49 Two cases that 
demonstrate the shortcomings of Turkish democracy are the famous Turk-
ish writer Orhan Pamuk’s indictment for statements he made during an 
interview with a Swiss newspaper on the Armenian and Kurdish issues and 
the controversy over a conference to discuss the Armenian issue.50
Turkey’s success in dealing with its chronic economic problems also 
will be of major importance, because successful policies could narrow the 
gap between Turkey’s per-capita income and the European average. Hence, 
at the time of Turkey’s EU membership, the much-feared wave of Turk-
ish immigrants to EU member states would be smaller, and Turkey would 
not be the enormous burden for the EU agricultural and structural funds 
budgets that many Europeans fear. Finally, yet importantly, there is the 
Cyprus issue. Turkey’s international position on the Cyprus question has 
improved because the Turkish Cypriots approved UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan’s proposed solution, while the Greek Cypriots rejected it, with both 
referenda held simultaneously in April 2004. Yet the Republic of Cyprus is 
an EU member state with full veto rights, meaning that an unresolved Cy-
prus issue will continue to be a frequent source of friction on Turkey’s way 
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toward membership. Turkey’s EU membership certainly has the potential to 
cause serious problems for both sides. Nonetheless, none of these problems 
are insurmountable. Compromises can be made. Transition periods can be 
discussed and agreed upon. The European Union needs to show its good 
faith in Turkey’s accession negotiations to protect its diplomatic credibility, 
while Turkey has to prove its continued strong commitment to economic 
and political reform.
What might prove difficult to overcome, though, is a mutual temp-
tation to use the issue of Turkey’s EU membership for domestic political 
purposes. Turkey’s past human rights and democratic record, the presence 
of large numbers of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe, and the persis-
tence of religious and cultural prejudices have contributed to the formation 
of a Turco-phobic European public opinion in many countries. This makes 
opposition to Turkey’s EU membership an easy way to rally domestic po-
litical support. Turning Turkey’s EU membership into a scapegoat for all 
European ills can distract from the discussion of crucial issues like Com-
mon Agricultural Policy reform and the uncertain future of the European 
socioeconomic model. Similarly, capitalizing on the nationalist feelings 
of Turkish public opinion can be a swift way to stall the process of politi-
cal and economic reform. Turkish opponents of membership can increase 
public concerns by pointing to the impossibility of membership, the alleged 
duplicity of the European Union, the inevitable sovereignty concessions that 
membership would require, and the inability of membership to serve as a 
panacea for all Turkish economic and social ills.51 It now seems improb-
able that the government of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) will consider such a policy shift, as it has anchored its 
own political future on the successful course of Turkey’s accession negotia-
tions. However, the situation may 
change if difficulties in the course 
of negotiations further alienate 
Turkish public opinion. The Eu-
ropean Commission and the Turk-
ish government have to confront 
European prejudices and lack of 
information about Turkey, as well 
as unrealistic Turkish expectations, 
nationalist fears, and lack of infor-
mation about the meaning of EU membership. Only by bridging this gap 
between public opinion and reality regarding Turkey’s membership can the 
interested parties hope to protect the already difficult accession negotiations 
from serious destabilization.
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